The CIA triad

Every security failure breaks one of three promises about data

Confidentialityonly those allowed can read itBroken whena customer database is copiedand sold onlineKept byencryption, access controlIntegrityit cannot change without noticeBroken whenthe bank details on an invoiceare quietly swappedKept byhashes, signatures, change logsAvailabilityit is there when it is neededBroken whenransomware locks a hospital’spatient records for weeksKept bybackups, redundancy, DDoS defenceSecurity protects three things about information: who can read it, whether it is true, and whether it is there.Confidentiality, integrity and availability, the CIA triad, are the yardstick for every control in this course.An attack is judged by which of the three it breaks; a control by which of the three it protects. Most realincidents break more than one: modern ransomware copies the data first, then locks it.

Confidentiality, integrity and availability: who can read it, whether it is true, whether it is there.

Security properties · Going deeper

Beyond the triad: authenticity, non-repudiation and AAA

Three more properties show up in every exam: authenticity, non-repudiation, and the AAA of identity.

Properties that extend the triad

  • Authenticity the data or message really comes from who it claims to. A signed software update proves its publisher.
  • Non-repudiation the sender cannot later deny sending it. A digital signature made with a private key only they hold gives this; a shared password cannot.
  • Privacy the right of a person to control how their personal data is collected and used. Confidentiality is a means to it, not the same thing.
  • Safety for systems that act in the physical world, such as a pump or a car, the first promise is that no one is harmed.

AAA: how a system enforces the triad for people

Authenticationprove who you are
Authorisationdecide what you may do
Accountingrecord what you did

Accounting, also called auditing, is what lets an investigator answer “who did this, and when?”. Lessons 7 and 8 cover the first two, lesson 11 the third.

The attacker’s view: DAD

Each property has an opposite. Disclosure breaks confidentiality, alteration breaks integrity, destruction (or denial) breaks availability. Some textbooks call this the DAD triad.

Exam habit: when a question describes an incident, first ask which of C, I or A it broke. The answer usually follows.

Threats and vulnerabilities

A loss needs a threat, a weakness and something worth taking

Change Healthcare, February 2024the largest health-data breach on record in the United StatesThreat actora ransomware gangstolen passwordVulnerabilityremote-access portalwith no second factor9 days insideAssetclaims and patient dataImpact192.7 million peopleclaims stopped for weeksBreak any link and the loss cannot happen:✓MFA on the portal closes the weakness✓data never held, nothing to takeThreats are rarely yours to remove, so defence works on the weaknesses and on what the asset is worth.A risk needs all three: a threat, a weakness it can use, and an asset worth something. Remove one and it is gone.A threat is anything that could cause harm; a vulnerability is a weakness it can exploit; an asset is what youwould lose. Attackers entered with a stolen password because the portal asked for nothing else. One setting wouldhave broken the chain. UnitedHealth paid a ransom of $22 million; the clean-up cost it more than $3 billion.

A threat uses a vulnerability to harm an asset. Break any link and the risk disappears.

Risk vocabulary · Going deeper

Asset, threat, vector, vulnerability, exploit, risk, control

TermMeaningIn the Change Healthcare caseAssetanything of value: data, systems, people, reputationpatient recordsThreata potential cause of harmransomwareThreat actorwho carries it out, with a motivea criminal gangThreat vectorthe path the attack takes ina remote-access portalVulnerabilitya weakness a threat can useno second factorExploitthe method that uses the weaknesslogging in with a stolen passwordRisklikelihood that harm happens, times its impacthigh: likely and severeControlanything that lowers the riskrequire MFA on every portalEight words every risk conversation and every exam question uses, each a separate part of the chain.Mixing them up is the commonest mistake: ransomware is a threat, not a vulnerability; the missing second factoris the vulnerability; the gang is the threat actor; the portal is the threat vector. Exposure is the degree towhich an asset is open to a threat. A control is any safeguard or countermeasure: a policy, a tool or a lock.

A threat actor uses a threat vector and an exploit against a vulnerability in an asset.

Likelihood and impact

Rank risks by how likely they are and how much they would hurt

NegligibleMinorModerateMajorSevere12345Likelihood → 1 rare … 5 almost certainImpact ↑ABCDEFive risks for one mid-size companyL × IAPhishing steals a staff password5 × 3 = 15firstBRansomware encrypts the file servers3 × 5 = 15firstDA DDoS takes the website down for hours3 × 3 = 9EAn insider copies the customer list2 × 4 = 8CA laptop is lost (its disk is encrypted)4 × 1 = 4Ratings are illustrative; each organisation scores its own.Risk is how likely a loss is, combined with how much it would hurt. Rank risks that way and fund the top first.A five-by-five matrix turns judgement into a ranking. Phishing is near certain but its harm is contained; ransomwareis less likely but could stop the business. Both land in the red corner. A lost laptop happens often and costslittle because the disk is encrypted: a control already moved it down. Scores are reviewed as things change.

Risk combines likelihood and impact. A matrix ranks risks so the money goes to the worst first.

Qualitative and quantitative risk · Going deeper · 1 of 2

Put a price on it: SLE, ARO and ALE

A flood in the server room, worked through$500,000asset value (AV)×40%exposure factor (EF)=$200,000single loss (SLE)×0.1 a yearonce in ten years (ARO)Expected loss a year (ALE)$20,000 without the control$4,000 with flood sensors and a raised floor (ARO 0.02)Saving $16,000 a year, for a control costing $8,000 a year: worth buying.Quantitative risk puts a price on it: single loss times yearly frequency gives the expected loss per year.SLE = AV × EF: what one event destroys. ALE = SLE × ARO: what you should expect to lose in an average year.A control is worth its price when the drop in ALE is larger than what the control costs each year. The inputsare estimates, so many teams use qualitative scores like the matrix and keep the arithmetic for large decisions.

SLE = asset value × exposure factor. ALE = SLE × ARO. A control is worth it if it cuts ALE by more than it costs.

Likelihood and impact · Going deeper · 2 of 2

An average breach costs $4.44 million and lasts 241 days

Average total cost of one data breach, 2025Global average$4.44 millionUnited States average$10.22 millionDays from the first intrusion to containment: 2410306090120150180210240about eight months241 daysOrganisations using security AI and automation widely: $1.9 million less, and 80 days shorter.An average breach costs $4.44 million and takes 241 days to find and contain. Impact is measured in money.These are IBM’s 2025 figures across 600 breached organisations. The cost covers investigation, notifying customers,lost business, fines and recovery. Speed is the biggest lever: the sooner an intrusion is found, the less it costs.This is why a board funds security: the controls cost less than the expected losses they prevent.

IBM 2025: $4.44 million average, $10.22 million in the US, 241 days from intrusion to containment.

Risk treatment

Reduce, transfer, avoid or accept: every risk gets one answer

The risk: customers can upload files that may carry malwareinherent score 15Reducescan every upload, accept onlyimages and PDFs, store apartresidual 6Transferinsurance covers the money;downtime and reputation stayresidual 11Avoiddo not build the feature:no risk, and no benefit eitherresidual 0Acceptlaunch as is: only allowedbelow the risk appetiteresidual 15risk appetite: 8Every risk gets one of four answers: reduce it, transfer it, avoid it, or accept it on purpose.Reducing (mitigating) adds controls. Transferring moves the financial loss to an insurer or a supplier, never thewhole harm. Avoiding stops the activity. Accepting is a signed decision by the risk owner, valid only when whatremains sits below the organisation’s risk appetite. Here, accepting would be wrong: 15 is far above 8.

Four risk treatments: reduce, transfer, avoid, accept. Acceptance is only valid below the risk appetite.

The risk register · Going deeper

Owner, score, treatment, residual: one row per risk

One row of a risk registerIDR-014RiskMalware in customer uploads reaches staff machinesOwnerHead of Product (a person, not a team)Inherentlikelihood 3 × impact 5 = 15TreatmentReduce: file-type allow-list, malware scan, isolated storageResiduallikelihood 2 × impact 3 = 6, below appetite 8: acceptedReviewevery quarter, and after any incidentA risk register lists every risk with its owner, score, treatment and residual risk, and is reviewed on a cycle.Inherent risk is the score before controls; residual risk is what remains after them. Risk appetite is how muchrisk the organisation is willing to carry overall; risk tolerance is the acceptable variation around it for oneobjective. A named owner signs off the residual risk, so acceptance is a decision, not an accident.

A risk register records each risk’s owner, inherent risk, treatment and residual risk.

Control types

Some controls act before an attack, some during it, some after

beforeafterthe attackDeterrentdiscourages tryingwarning bannervisible camerasPreventivestops it happeningMFA, firewall rulelocked doorDetectivenotices it happeningintrusion alertlog reviewCorrectiverepairs the damagerestore from backuppatch, rebuildAlso:Directive tells people what to do (a policy, a sign). Compensating stands in when the usual control cannot be used.A control’s type is when it acts: deterrent and preventive before an attack, detective during, corrective after.No preventive control is perfect, so every important risk needs a detective control that notices failure and acorrective one that limits the damage. A compensating control replaces one that is not possible: an old machinethat cannot be patched is moved to an isolated network instead.

Deterrent and preventive controls act before, detective during, corrective after.

Control selection · Going deeper · 1 of 4

Choosing controls that work together

Good control sets pair prevention with detection and correction, and cost less than the risk they reduce.

Why one type is never enough

Preventive controls fail silently: when a phishing email gets through the filter, nothing tells you. A detective control turns that silent failure into an alert; a corrective control limits how far it spreads. Design each important risk with at least one of each.

Compensating controls in practice

  • A legacy machine cannot be patched isolate it on its own network segment and allow only the one connection it needs.
  • A small team cannot separate duties have a manager review every payment log weekly.
  • A payment system cannot meet a PCI DSS requirement as written the standard allows a documented compensating control that meets the intent and is validated each year.

Selecting a control

  • Effective it measurably lowers likelihood or impact.
  • Proportionate its yearly cost is lower than the reduction in expected loss.
  • Usable people will not work around it; a control that slows everyone down gets bypassed.
  • Testable you can check that it still works, which is what audits do (lesson 14).
Exam pattern: “What type of control is X?” Identify when it acts. A camera is detective when recorded footage is reviewed, deterrent when its visibility is the point.

Control types · Going deeper · 2 of 4

Each control has a category and a type, and exams ask for both

PreventiveDetectiveCorrectiveDeterrentTechnicalfirewall rule, MFAintrusion detection alertrestore from backuplogin warning bannerManagerialchange-approval policyregular risk assessmentincident response plandisciplinary policyOperationalawareness traininganalyst reviews logsresponders rebuild a serverguard patrolsPhysicallocked door, bollardsCCTV, motion sensorfire suppressionfence, lighting, signsCategory: what the control is. Type: what it does. Every control has one of each.Every control has a category, what it is made of, and a type, what it does. Exams ask for both.Technical controls are enforced by systems; managerial controls are decisions and documents; operational controlsare things people do day to day; physical controls work on the building. ISC2 uses three categories instead:administrative, technical (also called logical) and physical. Operational controls fold into administrative.

Categories: technical, managerial, operational, physical. Types: preventive, detective, corrective, deterrent.

Control types · Going deeper · 3 of 4

No one person should be able to finish a risky action alone

Create a supplierAccounts clerkEnter the invoiceAccounts clerkApprove paymentFinance managerRelease the moneyTreasuryA dishonest clerkadds a fake supplier and a fake invoice…✗ cannot approve their own invoice: stoppedFraud now needs two people to collude, which is far rarer and far easier to detect.Separation of duties: split a risky task so no single person can complete it, or hide it, alone.It defends against both fraud and honest error. Related rules: dual control (two people act together, as witha vault’s two keys), job rotation and mandatory holidays (hidden fraud surfaces when someone else does the job),and least privilege (each person holds only the access their own step needs).

Separation of duties splits a sensitive task across people, so fraud needs collusion.

Security design principles · Going deeper · 4 of 4

The design principles behind every control

Least privilege, need to know, defence in depth, fail secure, secure by default, keep it simple.

Principles you will see in every lesson

  • Least privilege every person and program gets only the access its task needs, for only as long as it needs it (lesson 8).
  • Need to know even with clearance, you see only the data your current work requires.
  • Defence in depth independent layers of control, so one failure is not a breach (lesson 9).
  • Separation of duties and dual control no single person can complete or conceal a sensitive action.
  • Fail secure when a control breaks, it denies access rather than allowing it: a crashed firewall drops traffic. Fire exits are the exception: life safety means fail safe (open).
  • Secure by default a system ships with the safe settings on; users must choose to weaken them.
  • Keep it simple every extra component and setting is more to get wrong. Complexity is the enemy of security.
  • Zero trust no request is trusted because of where it comes from; each is verified (lesson 9).

Job rotation and mandatory holidays

Fraud often needs constant hiding: the person behind it never takes leave. Making staff take holidays, or rotating them between roles, hands the work to someone else who may notice.

Professional ethics

ISC2 members commit to its Code of Ethics, whose four canons in order are: protect society, the common good and the infrastructure; act honourably, honestly, justly, responsibly and legally; provide diligent and competent service to principals; and advance and protect the profession. When canons conflict, the earlier one wins.

The ISC2 CC exam tests the order of the four canons. Society comes first, the profession last.

Lesson complete

You finished “Security principles and risk”

Nicely done.

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