Threat actors

Attackers differ by motive, skill and money, and so must the defence

less skill and moneymore skill and moneyUnskilled attackerthrill, notorietyreuses others’ toolsHacktivista political causedefacing, leaking, DDoSInsiderrevenge, money, erroralready has accessOrganised crimemoneyransomware, fraudNation-stateespionage, disruptionyears of patienceinside the walls: skill varies, access does notAttackers differ in motive, skill and money, and each kind calls for a different defence.Unskilled attackers are stopped by basic hygiene. Organised crime is a business that picks the cheapest way in.Nation-states, called advanced persistent threats (APTs), spend months hidden in a network. Insiders bypass theperimeter entirely. Shadow IT, systems staff set up without approval, is listed as a threat too: risk nobody owns.

Threat actors range from unskilled attackers to organised crime and nation-states; insiders start inside.

Threat actor attributes · Going deeper

Internal or external, resources, sophistication and motive

Exams describe a threat actor by four attributes and ask you to name it, or by its motivation.

Four attributes

  • Internal or external insiders and contractors start with access; everyone else must gain it.
  • Resources and funding from a laptop and free tools to a state budget and dedicated teams.
  • Level of sophistication from copying public exploits to finding and using unknown (zero-day) flaws.
  • Motivation what they want, which predicts what they will target.

Motivations named in the objectives

Moneyfinancial gain, blackmail, ransomware
Secretsespionage, data exfiltration
Disruptionservice disruption, chaos, war
Beliefpolitical, philosophical, ethical; revenge

Two that are easy to forget

  • Shadow IT staff using systems or cloud services the organisation has not approved. Not malicious, but unmanaged, unpatched and invisible to security.
  • Advanced persistent threat (APT) an actor, usually state-backed, that gains access and stays undetected for a long time to steal data. “Persistent” is the defining word.
An insider is not only a malicious employee: a careless one who emails the wrong file is the more common insider incident.

Initial access

Most breaches start with a stolen login, an exposed flaw or a lure

How breaches began, 2025share of breaches with a known starting pointStolen or guessed credentials22%Exploiting a software flaw20%Phishing and pretexting16%Exploitation rose from 15% a year earlier;22% of the flaws exploited were in VPNs and edge devices.60%involved a persona click, a mistake, a misuse44%included ransomwareup from 37% a year earlier30%involved a third partydouble the year beforeMost breaches start with a stolen login, an unpatched edge device or a message that fools someone.These are Verizon’s 2025 figures from 12,195 confirmed breaches. Three doors account for most intrusions,which is why multi-factor sign-in, fast patching of internet-facing systems and trained staff come first inevery serious security programme. The attack surface is the sum of every door an attacker could try.

Verizon 2025: credential abuse 22%, exploitation 20%, phishing 16% of breaches began this way.

Attack surface · Going deeper

Every door an attacker could try, and how to shrink it

The attack surface is every reachable entry point; threat vectors are the paths attackers use through it.

Common threat vectors

  • Message-based email, SMS (smishing), instant messages, voice calls (vishing), QR codes (quishing).
  • Unpatched or end-of-life software especially internet-facing VPNs, firewalls and file-transfer servers.
  • Open service ports and default credentials a remote desktop port left open, an admin password never changed.
  • Removable media and images a USB stick left in a car park; a malicious file disguised as a picture.
  • Supply chain managed service providers, vendors and software suppliers who hold trust in your network.
  • Wireless and Bluetooth rogue access points, insecure pairing.

Shrinking the surface

Turn off what is not needed, close ports, remove default accounts, patch what faces the internet first, and require a second factor everywhere a password is accepted. The median time to fully patch edge-device flaws in Verizon’s data was 32 days; attackers often exploit them within days of disclosure.

The Cyber Kill Chain

An intrusion runs through seven steps, and each is a chance to stop it

Target, November and December 20131Reconnaissancesuppliers withnetwork accessfound online2Weaponisationmalware put in anemail attachment(likely)3Deliveryphishing email toFazio Mechanical,an HVAC supplier4Exploitationthe supplier’slogin used to getin: 12 Nov 20135Installationcard-stealingmalware on tills,most by 30 Nov6Command andcontrola channel keptopen to theoutside for weeks7Actions onobjectives11 GB sent outfrom 2 Dec: 40mcards, 70m recordsalerts fired,not acted onalerts fired,not acted onAn intrusion moves through seven steps, and each one is a chance to stop it before the last.Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain (2011) models an attack from the outside in. The US Senate used it to showwhere Target could have stopped the breach: the supplier had weak security, intrusion alerts fired at steps 5 and 7and were not acted on, and the till network was not separated from the systems the supplier could reach.

The Cyber Kill Chain: reconnaissance, weaponisation, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, actions on objectives.

The Target breach · Going deeper · 1 of 6

Five weeks inside, and two ignored alerts, drawn to scale

Days to scale, 8 November to 20 December 20138 Nov15 Nov22 Nov29 Nov6 Dec13 Dec20 Decabout September: a supplier’s login is stolen by phishing (off the scale, to the left)12 Noventers with the supplier’s login15 Novtests malware on a few tills30 Novmalware on most tills; alerts2 Decdata starts to leave; alerts12 DecJustice Dept. alerts Target15 Decmost malware removed19 Decbreach made publicAlerts fired on 30 November and 2 December. Target learned of the breach from the government ten days later.The intruders were inside for more than a month. The detection tools worked; the response did not: alerts weretriaged as routine and automatic malware removal had been switched off. Lesson 11 is about turning alerts intoaction. Shaded bands mark when malware was being tested on tills and when card data was leaving.

Alerts on 30 November and 2 December went unanswered; the government told Target on 12 December.

The Cyber Kill Chain · Going deeper · 2 of 6

Fifteen tactics name what attackers are trying to do at each moment

1 ReconnaissanceT1593 search open websites2 Resource developmentT1583 acquire infrastructure3 Initial accessT1078 valid accounts4 ExecutionT1059 command interpreter5 PersistenceT1136 create an account6 Privilege escalationT1068 exploit for privilege7 StealthT1027 obfuscated files8 Defense impairmentT1562 impair defenses9 Credential accessT1003 credential dumping10 DiscoveryT1046 network scanning11 Lateral movementT1021 remote services12 CollectionT1560 archive the data13 Command and controlT1071 web protocols14 ExfiltrationT1567 to a web service15 ImpactT1486 encrypt for impactTactic = the attacker’s goal at that moment (why). Technique = one way to reach it (how), with an ID. Purple: new in v19 (2026).MITRE ATT&CK catalogues what real attackers do: 15 goals, each with the techniques used to reach it.It is built from public reports of real intrusions and is the shared language of defenders: detections, red-teamplans and threat reports are mapped to technique IDs such as T1078. Attacks do not run left to right in order;they loop. Version 19 (April 2026) split Defense Evasion into Stealth and Defense Impairment.

MITRE ATT&CK maps real attacks as tactics (the goal) and techniques (the method), each with an ID.

The Diamond Model · Going deeper · 3 of 6

Adversary, capability, infrastructure, victim: pivot on any corner

Adversarya ransomware affiliateVictima health payments firmCapabilitystolen login, ransomwareInfrastructureservers, accounts, domainsEvery intrusion event has four corners.Know three, and the fourth can often be found:the same infrastructure seen against anothervictim points to the same adversary.Kill Chain: the order of steps.ATT&CK: the catalogue of techniques.Diamond: who, with what, from where, to whom.The Diamond Model links adversary, capability, infrastructure and victim, so one clue leads to the next.It comes from intelligence analysis (Caltagirone, Pendergast and Betz, 2013). Analysts pivot along its edges: aserver seen in one attack is searched for in others, revealing the same adversary’s wider campaign. Security+SY0-801 names it beside the Kill Chain and ATT&CK as a reference model.

The Diamond Model links four features of every intrusion so analysts can pivot from one to the next.

Tactics, techniques and procedures · Going deeper · 4 of 6

TTPs: how defenders use ATT&CK in practice

TTPs describe how an adversary operates. ATT&CK gives each one a shared ID.

Three levels

  • Tactic the goal: “credential access”.
  • Technique how the goal is reached: “OS credential dumping, T1003”. Many have sub-techniques, such as T1003.001 for dumping LSASS memory.
  • Procedure the specific way one group does it: a named tool with particular commands.

Four everyday uses

  • Detection coverage colour the matrix by which techniques your logs and tools can detect, and find the gaps.
  • Threat-informed defence look up the groups that target your industry and prioritise their techniques.
  • Red and purple teaming plan tests technique by technique and check each was seen.
  • Reporting incident and threat reports cite technique IDs, so findings can be compared and shared.
ATT&CK has three matrices: Enterprise (Windows, macOS, Linux, cloud, network, containers), Mobile and ICS. The free ATT&CK Navigator lets you build and share coverage maps.

The Cyber Kill Chain · Going deeper · 5 of 6

Block what attackers do, not the files they use, and it costs them most

Hash valuestrivialrecompile the fileIP addresseseasyrent another serverDomain namessimpleregister a new oneNetwork and host artefactsannoyingchange a settingToolschallengingfind or write new toolsTTPs: how they operatetoughlearn to work differentlyPain to themWhat they must do to recoverBlocking what an attacker does hurts far more than blocking the files and addresses they use.A file hash changes if one byte of malware changes; an IP address costs pennies to replace. Detecting behaviour,such as dumping passwords from memory, forces the attacker to change how they work, which is slow and costly.This is David Bianco’s Pyramid of Pain, and the reason ATT&CK maps techniques rather than files.

The Pyramid of Pain: hashes and IPs are trivial to change; TTPs are tough.

Threat intelligence · Going deeper · 6 of 6

Where intelligence comes from, and how to use it

Threat intelligence turns raw indicators into decisions: what to block, hunt and patch first.

Sources

  • Open source (OSINT) vendor and government advisories, security blogs, public reports, social media.
  • CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog flaws confirmed as exploited in the wild; patch these first.
  • Sharing communities ISACs (information sharing and analysis centres) for each industry, such as FS-ISAC for finance.
  • Commercial feeds curated indicators and reports on threat groups, delivered to firewalls and SIEMs.
  • Dark web monitoring stolen credentials or data offered for sale that belong to you.

Formats

Indicators are shared as STIX (a structured format for threat information) over TAXII (a protocol to exchange it), so tools can consume them automatically.

Three levels of intelligence

Strategictrends for leaders: who targets our sector, and why
Operationalcampaigns and TTPs for defenders and hunters
Tacticalindicators for tools: hashes, IPs, domains

Ransomware as a service

Ransomware is an industry, with suppliers, brokers and affiliates

Developersbuild and rent the kittake a share of each ransomAccess brokerssell ways into companiesstolen logins, open VPNskitaccessAffiliatesrun the attackkeep most of the moneyVictimdata copied, thenencrypted: “pay, orwe publish it”44%of breaches had ransomware$115,000median ransom paid64%of victims refused to payRansomware is an industry: developers rent it out, brokers sell the way in, affiliates run the attack.This division of labour, ransomware as a service, is why attacks are frequent and skilled. Double extortion stealsthe data before encrypting it, so backups alone no longer remove the pressure to pay. More victims now refuse:figures are from Verizon’s 2025 report. Paying funds the next attack and guarantees nothing.

In ransomware as a service, developers rent the kit, access brokers sell the way in, affiliates attack. Double extortion adds a leak threat.

Supply chain attacks

One breached supplier opens the door to every one of its customers

Breaches involving a third party2024 report15%2025 report30%One supplierthousands of customers at onceTarget, 2013a heating supplier’s loginSolarWinds, 2020a poisoned update, up to 18,000 customersMOVEit, 2023one file-transfer flaw, thousands of firmsXZ Utils, 2024a backdoor caught before it spreadAttackers increasingly come in through suppliers you trust: one breach upstream reaches every customer.Software updates, managed service providers and shared tools all carry trust into your network. Third-partyinvolvement in breaches doubled in a year. Defences are covered in lesson 14: vet suppliers, limit what theiraccess can reach, and keep an inventory of the software components you run (an SBOM).

A supply chain attack compromises a trusted supplier, update or service to reach its customers.

AI-enabled threats

AI makes old attacks cheaper and opens new ones against AI itself

AI used by attackersAttacks on AI systemsDeepfake video call, Hong Kong, 2024a “finance chief” and colleagues, all fake,won 15 transfers worth about US$25 millionPhishing at scalefluent, personal lures in any language;faster reconnaissance and malware variantsPrompt injectioninstructions hidden in a page or email take over a modelData poisoningtainted training data plants a hidden behaviourJailbreakingphrasing that talks a model past its safety rulesHallucinationinvented facts or package names that attackers then claimAI makes old attacks cheaper and more convincing, and adds new attacks against the AI systems themselves.A voice or face is no longer proof of identity: confirm payment requests on a separate, known channel. Systemsbuilt on language models inherit a new attack surface, because their instructions and their data share one input.Security+ SY0-801 adds these threats to its objectives, and ISC2 weaves AI through every CC domain.

Attackers use AI for deepfakes and phishing at scale; AI systems face prompt injection, data poisoning and jailbreaks.

Lesson complete

You finished “Attackers and how attacks unfold”

Nicely done.

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