Security Principles reference
133 commands, numbers and terms from the 15 lessons, one line each. The right-hand column opens the page that teaches it.
1Security principles and risk
| Confidentiality, integrity, availability | The three promises every failure breaks one of | The CIA triad |
| Authenticity, non-repudiation, AAA | It came from them; they cannot deny it; authenticate, authorise, account | Security properties |
| Risk | Threat × vulnerability × asset value, as likelihood × impact | Threats and vulnerabilities |
| SLE = asset value × exposure factor | Single loss expectancy | Qualitative and quantitative risk |
| ALE = SLE × ARO | Annual loss expectancy: SLE times yearly rate of occurrence | Qualitative and quantitative risk |
| $4.44 million, 241 days | Average cost and life of a breach (IBM, 2025) | Likelihood and impact |
| Mitigate, transfer, avoid, accept | The four risk treatments | Risk treatment |
| Risk register | Owner, score, treatment and residual risk, one row per risk | The risk register |
| Preventive, detective, corrective, deterrent, compensating, directive | Control types: when and how a control acts | Control types |
| Technical, managerial, operational, physical | Control categories: what a control is made of | Control types |
| Separation of duties, least privilege, defence in depth | No one finishes a risky action alone; only what is needed; many layers | Control types |
2Attackers and how attacks unfold
| Nation-state, organised crime, hacktivist, insider, unskilled attacker | Threat actors by motive, skill and money | Threat actors |
| Attack surface | Every door an attacker could try | Threat actor attributes |
| TTPs | Tactics, techniques and procedures | Threat actor attributes |
| OSINT, ISACs, threat feeds | Where intelligence comes from | Threat actor attributes |
| Credential abuse 22%, exploitation 20%, phishing 16% | Top ways in (Verizon DBIR 2025) | Initial access |
| Kill Chain | Recon, weaponise, deliver, exploit, install, command and control, act | The Cyber Kill Chain |
| ATT&CK | 15 Enterprise tactics in v19 (2026); techniques under each | The Cyber Kill Chain |
| Diamond Model | Adversary, capability, infrastructure, victim | The Diamond Model |
| Pyramid of Pain | Hashes and IPs are cheap to change; behaviour (TTPs) is expensive | The Cyber Kill Chain |
| Ransomware as a service | Developers, initial access brokers, affiliates | Ransomware as a service |
| Supply chain attack | One breached supplier reaches all its customers (SolarWinds: under 18,000) | Supply chain attacks |
3Social engineering
| Authority, urgency, scarcity, social proof, familiarity, intimidation | The levers attackers pull | Social engineering |
| SPF, DKIM, DMARC | Allowed senders, a signature, the policy for failures | Email authentication |
| Phishing, vishing, smishing, quishing | By email, voice, text, QR code | Phishing channels |
| BEC | One email in a real thread redirects a payment; $2.77 billion lost in 2024 (FBI) | Business email compromise |
| Pretexting | A believable story told to a help desk | Pretexting |
| MFA fatigue | Push after push until one is approved: use number matching | Pretexting |
| Adversary in the middle | A proxy page relays your code and keeps the session | Pretexting |
| Report fast | Someone will click; minutes to report decide the damage | Security awareness |
4Malware and vulnerabilities
| Virus, worm, trojan, ransomware, rootkit, keylogger, logic bomb | Malware named by how it spreads, hides and acts | Malware types |
| CISA KEV, EPSS | Known exploited now / probability of exploitation soon | Analysing malware |
| Patch cycle | Inventory, prioritise, test, deploy, verify | Analysing malware |
| WannaCry | Fix out 14 March 2017, attack 12 May 2017: 59 days | Worms and patching |
| SQL injection | Use parameterised queries, never string-built SQL | Injection |
| XSS | Attacker script runs as the site; encode output, set a Content Security Policy | Injection |
| Buffer overflow | Writes past a buffer into what runs next | Injection |
| CVE | One public ID per flaw | CVE and disclosure |
| CVSS | 0 to 10 for severity, not urgency; Log4Shell scored 10.0 | CVE and disclosure |
5Cryptography
| Symmetric, asymmetric, hash | One key, two keys, no key | Cryptographic primitives |
| AES-128 / AES-256 | Brute force out of reach; DES (56 bits) fell in 1998 | Symmetric encryption |
| AES-GCM | Authenticated encryption: secret and tamper-evident; never ECB | Modes and ciphers |
| HSM, TPM, KMS | Where keys live so they cannot be copied out | Modes and ciphers |
| n(n − 1) ÷ 2 | Keys needed for n people with shared keys | Key distribution |
| RSA, ECC | Lock with the public key, open with the private one | Asymmetric encryption |
| Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) | Agree a secret over an open line | Asymmetric encryption |
| SHA-256 | 256-bit fingerprint; one change flips about half the bits | Hashing |
| Digital signature | Hash, signed with the private key, checked with the public key | Digital signatures |
| Equal strength | 128-bit symmetric = RSA 3072 = ECC 256 | Hybrid encryption |
| ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA | Post-quantum standards (2024); RSA and ECC disallowed after 2035 | Hybrid encryption |
6Certificates and TLS
| X.509 certificate | Subject, public key, issuer, validity, extensions, CA signature | X.509 certificates |
| DV / OV / EV, wildcard, SAN | Validation levels; *.example.com; several names in one | Certificate types and formats |
| .pem .crt .der .pfx | Certificate file formats | Certificate types and formats |
| ACME | Automatic issue and renewal (Let's Encrypt) | Certificate types and formats |
| mTLS, HSTS | Both sides show certificates; browsers use https only | Certificate types and formats |
| Root, intermediate, leaf | The chain of trust; roots stay offline | Chain of trust |
| Certificate Transparency | Every public certificate is logged | Chain of trust |
| Validation | Chain, dates, name, not revoked, allowed use | Certificate validation |
openssl s_client -connect site:443 | See a server's certificate chain | Certificate validation |
| 200 / 100 / 47 days | Maximum certificate life from March 2026 / 2027 / 2029 | Certificate lifetimes |
| CRL, OCSP, stapling | Revocation lists, live check, the server attaches the answer | Certificate lifetimes |
| TLS 1.3 | One round trip; only forward-secret key exchange | TLS handshake |
7Authentication
| Something you know, have, are | The three factor types; MFA uses two different ones | Authentication factors |
| FAR, FRR, CER | False accepts, false rejects, the point where they cross | Authentication factors |
| Salted, slow hash | Argon2id, scrypt, bcrypt (cost ≥ 10), PBKDF2 600,000 iterations | Password storage |
| Rainbow table, pepper, key stretching | Precomputed hashes; a secret added server-side; hash many times | Hashing and salting |
| AAL1 / AAL2 / AAL3 | One factor / two factors / hardware-backed, phishing-resistant | Hashing and salting |
| NIST 800-63B-4 | At least 15 characters alone (8 with MFA), no composition rules, no forced changes | Password policy |
| Credential stuffing | Reused passwords tried on every site | Credential stuffing |
| SMS < app code < push with number match < FIDO2/passkey | Second factors by phishing resistance | Second factor strength |
| Passkey | Signs a challenge for one site; the server keeps only a public key | Passkeys |
8Authorisation and access
| Joiner, mover, leaver | Access follows a person through the organisation | Identity life cycle |
| DAC, MAC, RBAC, rule-based, ABAC | Owner, labels, role, rule, attributes decide | Access control models |
| Bell-LaPadula | No read up, no write down (confidentiality) | Mandatory access control |
| Just-in-time access, password vault | Admin rights borrowed for an hour, recorded | Privileged access |
| Access review, break-glass account | Recheck who has what; an emergency login sealed and monitored | Least privilege in practice |
| SAML | XML assertion from an identity provider: SSO for business apps | Single sign-on and SAML |
| OAuth 2.0 | Grants an app access with a token, never your password; use PKCE | Single sign-on and SAML |
| OpenID Connect | OAuth plus an ID token: who signed in | Single sign-on and SAML |
| Conditional access | Who, which device, where, how risky, at every sign-in | Conditional access |
9Network security
| Segmentation | One break-in stays in one room | Segmentation |
| Screened subnet (DMZ), microsegmentation, air gap | Ways to separate | Ways to segment |
| NGFW / WAF | Knows applications and users / protects web apps from injection and XSS | Ways to segment |
| Policy engine, administrator, enforcement point | Zero trust parts (NIST SP 800-207) | Ways to segment |
| Firewall rules | Top to bottom, first match wins, deny by default | Firewall rules |
| IDS / IPS | Reports / blocks; signature or anomaly based | IDS and IPS |
| False positive / false negative | Alarm with no attack / attack with no alarm | IDS and IPS |
| DDoS defence | Be bigger than the flood: scrubbing, CDN, rate limits | DDoS |
| 22, 443, 465/587, 636, 853, 993, 995 | SSH, HTTPS, SMTPS/submission, LDAPS, DoT, IMAPS, POP3S | Secure protocols |
10Protecting devices, applications and data
| At rest, in transit, in use | Each state of data needs its own protection | Data states |
| Full-disk / file / database / cloud encryption | Which helps against which loss | Encryption at rest |
| EDR / XDR / MDR | Watches behaviour on endpoints / across sources / run as a service | Encryption at rest |
| SAST, DAST, SCA, SBOM | Scan code, test the running app, check dependencies, list components | Encryption at rest |
| Public, internal, confidential, restricted | Classify first, then protect by class | Data classification |
| Clear, purge, destroy | Sanitising media before reuse or disposal (NIST SP 800-88) | Data classification |
| Masking, tokenisation, encryption, hashing | Hide, substitute, lock, fingerprint | Data classification |
| Card masking | Show at most the first six and last four digits (PCI DSS) | Data classification |
| DLP | Spots sensitive data leaving by email, upload or USB | Data loss prevention |
| Hardening | Remove what you do not need; CIS Benchmarks for the rest | Hardening |
11Detecting attacks
| Dwell time | 416 days in 2011, 10 to 14 days now (Mandiant) | Dwell time |
| Windows 4624 / 4625 / 4688 | Logon, failed logon, process created | Log management |
| SOAR, UEBA | Automated response playbooks; user behaviour baselines | Log management |
| Red, blue, purple | Attack, defend, both working together | Log management |
| SIEM | Collects logs and correlates quiet signals into one alert | SIEM |
| Baseline | Know normal so abnormal stands out | SIEM |
| Credentialed scan | Sees what is really installed | Vulnerability scanning |
| Rules of engagement | Scope, times and permission before any test | Penetration testing |
| Threat hunting | Assume they are in; test a hypothesis | Penetration testing |
12Incident response
| Preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, recovery, lessons learned | The incident response cycle | Incident response lifecycle |
| Playbook, tabletop exercise | Steps written in advance; rehearse them | Preparing to respond |
| Image and hash | Copy the disk bit for bit and prove it with a hash | Preparing to respond |
| Contain | Isolate, do not power off: memory holds evidence | Containment |
| Order of volatility | Registers and cache, memory, network state, disk, logs, backups | Digital forensics |
| Chain of custody | Who held the evidence, when, and why | Chain of custody |
| GDPR 72 h, NIS2 24 h / 72 h, SEC 4 business days | Reporting deadlines | Notification |
| Five whys | Keep asking until you reach a fix | Lessons learned |
13Backup and recovery
| RPO / RTO | How much data you may lose / how long you may be down | RPO and RTO |
| Full, incremental, differential | Incremental is quick to take, slow to restore; differential the reverse | Backup types |
| Snapshot, replication, journaling | Point in time; live copy; log of changes | Backup and replication methods |
| MTD, MTBF, MTTR | Most downtime tolerable, time between failures, time to repair | Backup and replication methods |
| 3-2-1-1-0 | 3 copies, 2 media, 1 off site, 1 offline or immutable, 0 restore errors | The 3-2-1 rule |
| Nines | 99.9% ≈ 8.8 hours down a year; 99.99% ≈ 53 minutes | Availability and redundancy |
| Hot, warm, cold site | Running, ready to start, an empty room | Recovery sites |
| BIA | The business decides what comes back first and how fast | Business impact analysis |
| Tabletop, simulation, parallel, full interruption | Ways to test recovery, cheapest first | Testing recovery |
14Governance, risk and compliance
| Law, policy, standard, procedure, guideline | From why to how, mandatory to advisory | Governance documents |
| Controller / processor | Decides why data is used / processes it for them | Governance documents |
| SLA, MSA, SOW, NDA, MOU, BPA | Agreements with third parties | Governance documents |
| Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover | NIST CSF 2.0 functions | NIST CSF 2.0 |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | 93 controls in four themes; three-year certification | ISO 27001 |
| GDPR fines | Up to €20 million or 4% of worldwide turnover | Regulations |
| Residual risk | What is left after controls; accepted on the record by its owner | Residual risk |
| SOC 2 Type I / Type II | Controls designed well on one day / worked over a period | Audits and attestation |
Nothing matches. Try a shorter word.
NeuroqAI · Security Principles · neuroqai.com/courses/security-principles/reference/