Social engineering
Attackers persuade people rather than break machines, using six levers
Social engineering uses authority, urgency, intimidation, social proof, familiarity and scarcity to make people act.
Why break encryption when you can ask for the password? Social engineering targets the person. And it uses the same few levers every time. Authority: the message comes from the chief executive. Urgency: within the hour. Intimidation: or your account is suspended. Social proof: everyone else has already done it. Familiarity: a friendly reference to somewhere you have been. Scarcity: only three left. Each one is designed to make you act before you think. So the habit to build is simple: pressure to hurry is itself the warning sign.
Phishing
A phishing email gives itself away in seven places
Phishing tells: a look-alike sender, a different reply-to, urgency, a generic greeting, a lying link, an odd attachment, a request for secrets.
Here is a typical phishing email, and its seven tells. The sender’s name says Microsoft 365. The address is a look-alike domain. Replies would go to a different, free mailbox. The subject threatens deletion within twenty-four hours. It greets you as dear user; the real service knows your name. The link text shows a real Microsoft address, but hover over it and it goes somewhere else entirely. The attachment is an HTML file: a fake sign-in page that runs on your own computer. And it asks for your password. No legitimate service ever does.
Email authentication · Going deeper
SPF, DKIM and DMARC: how mail servers check a sender
SPF lists allowed servers, DKIM signs the message, DMARC tells receivers what to do when both fail.
SPF lists allowed servers, DKIM signs the message, DMARC tells receivers what to do when both fail. Three DNS records that make spoofing harder. SPF (Sender Policy Framework) a DNS record listing the servers allowed to send mail for a domain. Mail from anywhere else fails. DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) the sending server signs each message with a private key; receivers check it with the public key published in DNS. A changed message fails. DMARC a policy that says what to do when SPF and DKIM do not line up with the visible From address: none (just report), quarantine or reject. What they do not stop. They prove a message came from the domain it claims. They do nothing about look-alike domains (m365-secure-mail.co passes its own SPF perfectly) or about a real mailbox that has been taken over. That is why people still need the tells, and why BEC from a compromised supplier sails through. Since 2024 Google and Yahoo require bulk senders to publish SPF, DKIM and DMARC. Set DMARC to p=reject once reports show your legitimate mail passes.
Three DNS records that make spoofing harder
- SPF (Sender Policy Framework) a DNS record listing the servers allowed to send mail for a domain. Mail from anywhere else fails.
- DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) the sending server signs each message with a private key; receivers check it with the public key published in DNS. A changed message fails.
- DMARC a policy that says what to do when SPF and DKIM do not line up with the visible From address: none (just report), quarantine or reject.
What they do not stop
They prove a message came from the domain it claims. They do nothing about look-alike domains (m365-secure-mail.co passes its own SPF perfectly) or about a real mailbox that has been taken over. That is why people still need the tells, and why BEC from a compromised supplier sails through.
Phishing channels
The same trick arrives by email, phone, text, QR code and in person
Spear phishing, whaling, vishing, smishing, quishing, watering hole and tailgating are one idea on different channels.
Phishing is not only email. By email, it ranges from bulk messages to spear phishing aimed at you, and whaling aimed at executives. By phone it is vishing, and now it can use a cloned voice. By text message, smishing. On the web, attackers compromise a site their targets already visit, a watering hole, or register a near-miss of a real domain. QR codes on posters and parking meters lead to fake payment pages: quishing. And in person, a confident visitor with full hands follows staff through a secure door. The channel changes. The trick does not.
Business email compromise
One email in a real thread can redirect a payment, with no malware
Business email compromise (BEC) hijacks or imitates a trusted mailbox to change where money goes.
The most costly email attack has no attachment and no link. A supplier sends a genuine invoice. You schedule payment. Then a reply arrives in the same thread: we have changed banks, please use this account. It comes from the supplier’s real mailbox, which an attacker took over weeks ago and has been reading ever since. Complaints to the FBI about this in 2024 reported two point seven seven billion dollars lost. The control is a rule, not a product. Any change of bank details is confirmed by phone, on a number you already had.
Pretexting
A believable story and a helpful help desk can hand over the keys
Pretexting invents a role and a reason. Help desks need identity verification that no story can bypass.
In September 2023, MGM Resorts lost control of its systems, and reportedly it began with a phone call. The attackers found an employee’s name and role on a professional networking site. They called the IT help desk, posing as that person: locked out, new phone. The help desk reset the password and the second factor. With that account the attackers reached the identity system itself. Ransomware followed; hotel rooms, slot machines and payments stopped working. The company put the cost at about a hundred million dollars in one quarter. The fix: no reset on someone’s word alone.
Pretexting · Going deeper · 1 of 2
Push prompt after push prompt, until one is approved
MFA fatigue (prompt bombing) floods approvals. Number matching and phishing-resistant MFA defeat it.
Multi-factor authentication stops most attacks. Attackers have found ways to wear it down. With a stolen password, they trigger sign-in prompts on the victim’s phone, again and again, late at night. Deny, deny, deny, then one tap on approve, just to make it stop. That is how Uber was breached in 2022: a contractor’s password, bought by the attacker, and a stream of push requests until one was accepted. Number matching makes the user type the code shown on the sign-in screen, so a stray prompt cannot be approved by reflex. Better still, passkeys and security keys have no prompt to accept at all.
Pretexting · Going deeper · 2 of 2
A proxy page can pass on your one-time code and keep your session
Adversary-in-the-middle phishing relays credentials and codes, then steals the session cookie. Passkeys stop it.
There is a phishing technique that defeats one-time codes entirely. The employee opens a look-alike sign-in page. It shows them the real page, because it is relaying it. They type their password and the code from their app. The page is a proxy, run by the attacker, copying everything. It passes the password and code to the real service, which signs in and hands back a session cookie. The proxy keeps it. The attacker is now signed in, second factor and all. A passkey prevents this, because it will only sign for the real site’s name. On the look-alike, it does nothing.
Security awareness
Someone will click; what matters is how fast someone reports
Security awareness training aims at fast reporting. One report lets the team pull a campaign from every inbox.
Training cannot make people perfect, and it does not need to. Verizon measured how fast people fall for phishing: a median of twenty-one seconds to click, and twenty-eight more to type their details. Less than a minute. What training does change is reporting. In Verizon’s 2025 data, people with recent training were about four times as likely to report a test phish: twenty-one percent instead of five. So make reporting one button. Use the first report to pull the message from every inbox. And never punish the person who clicked and then told you, or the next one will stay silent.
Awareness programme · Going deeper
What a security awareness programme covers
Awareness covers phishing, passwords, data handling, physical security and reporting, measured over time.
Awareness covers phishing, passwords, data handling, physical security and reporting, measured over time. Topics in the exam objectives. Recognising phishing and social engineering with simulated campaigns that teach at the moment of the click. Anomalous behaviour risky, unexpected or unintentional actions colleagues should report. Password and MFA hygiene password managers, never reusing passwords, never approving unexpected prompts. Handling data classification labels, where sensitive data may and may not go, removable media. Physical and remote work badges, tailgating, clean desks, public Wi-Fi, screen privacy. Policies and handbooks acceptable use, and how to report an incident. Measuring it. ISC2 CC 2026 places security awareness in the Security Governance domain: training, education and measuring its effectiveness.
Topics in the exam objectives
- Recognising phishing and social engineering with simulated campaigns that teach at the moment of the click.
- Anomalous behaviour risky, unexpected or unintentional actions colleagues should report.
- Password and MFA hygiene password managers, never reusing passwords, never approving unexpected prompts.
- Handling data classification labels, where sensitive data may and may not go, removable media.
- Physical and remote work badges, tailgating, clean desks, public Wi-Fi, screen privacy.
- Policies and handbooks acceptable use, and how to report an incident.
Measuring it
Lesson complete
You finished “Social engineering”
Nicely done.