The problem
A breach usually starts with one ordinary-looking email
An invoice-sharing email with a sign-in link reaches 40 people in sales and finance.
A company of 300 people, with email, a shared drive, and a finance system that pays suppliers. One morning, 40 people in sales and finance get an email: an invoice has been shared with you, sign in to view it. Invoices arrive like this every day. We will follow this one all the way to the money.
The attack chain
An attack is a chain, and each link needs the one before it
3 click, 1 types a password. A mailbox rule hides replies, and finance pays $48,600 to new bank details.
The email goes out. Three people click, and one, Dana in sales, types a password into the fake page. The attacker signs in as Dana. They add a rule that quietly moves any reply about invoices into a folder Dana never opens. Then, from Dana's real mailbox, they tell finance the supplier has new bank details. Finance pays $48,600. Nine days later the real supplier asks where its money is.
The first defence
Training is a filter, not a wall
Training brought it down to 3 clicks in 40. The attacker needs only one.
Forty emails. The staff had been trained, and thirty-seven of forty did the right thing. Three clicked, and one typed a password. That is a good result for a convincing email, and it is still enough. A defence that needs every person to be right every time cannot stand alone.
The cause
Each link held because one control was missing there
No MFA at sign-in, no alert on a new mail rule, and one person could change bank details.
The spam filter missed a fresh, clean domain, and training worked for most people. After that, a password alone let the attacker in. A new rule hiding mail raised no alert. And one person in finance could change a supplier’s bank details on the strength of an email. Three missing controls, each one cheap.
The fix
Three controls, one per link; any one stops the chain
A passkey at sign-in, an alert on new mail rules, and a phone check with two approvers for bank changes.
A passkey or a security key signs in only to the real site, so a password typed on a fake page is useless. An alert when anyone creates a rule that hides or forwards mail fires within minutes. And a change of bank details is confirmed by calling the supplier on a number already on file, then approved by a second person. Any one of the three breaks this chain.
Respond and recover
Response runs in the same order; the alert decides when it starts
Detect, contain, eradicate, recover, learn. Detection took 9 days; an alert would take 4 minutes.
Detect. Contain: reset the password, revoke every session and token, and block the lookalike domain. Eradicate: delete the rule, check the other two people who clicked, and search every mailbox for similar rules. Recover: ask the bank to recall the payment straight away. Then lessons learned. The difference is when it starts. Found by the supplier after 9 days, the money was gone. Found by an alert after 4 minutes, none would have left.
Defence in depth
Layers around what matters, so one failure is not the end
Awareness, sign-in, least privilege, alerts, two approvers, response. Each ring links to its lesson.
Here is the company again, as layers around the money. Awareness and reporting. Sign-in that cannot be phished. Least privilege. Logs and alerts. Two approvers for payments. And a response the team has practised. The attacker must pass every ring; the company needs only one to hold. Each ring opens the lesson that teaches it.
A real case
At Twitter in 2020, a phone call and a fake VPN page
Callers posing as the IT help desk phished staff and their MFA approvals, then took over 130 accounts.
In July 2020, attackers phoned Twitter employees, posing as the IT help desk with a VPN problem, and sent them to a fake VPN login. Whatever was typed there, they typed into the real site at once, and some employees approved the MFA prompt that followed. Using internal tools, they took over a hundred and thirty accounts, tweeted a bitcoin scam from forty-five, and collected about a hundred and eighteen thousand dollars, in roughly a day. New York’s financial regulator recommended exactly this case’s fixes: hardware keys that cannot be phished, a second person for sensitive actions, and monitoring.
Lesson complete
You finished “One email, one breach”
Nicely done.